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Abstract
This paper develops a model of international capital flows when there is asymmetric informa-
tion between foreign investors and domestic managers. Direct investors have a direct influence
on the management, thus overcoming agency and information problems. This information ad-
vantage, however, comes at the cost of having to acquire management expertise. The tradeoff
between management costs and the costs of asymmetric information consequently determines
the level and composition of a country’s international capital flows. Analyzing how this tradeoff
changes with economic conditions in a country, the model can qualitatively capture the expe-
riences of many crisis countries during the 1990s. Specifically, the model can capture the rise
in FDI inflows despite the reversals of foreign portfolio investment inflows during deteriorating
economic conditions which has been documented in this paper for the crises that involved no
sovereign default or no imposition of capital controls. Moreover, the model can also explain
growing evidence on the impacts of good governance and institutional quality on the composi-
tion of a country’s capital flows, predicting a lower level of capital inflows and a larger share of
FDI in countries with weaker corporate governance.
JEL Classifications: F21, F23, F34, F41, G14, G20, G32. Keywords: Foreign direct investment,
international capital flows, asymmetric information, corporate governance.
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1 Introduction
The 1990s was a period characterized by a dramatic increase in the volume of international capital
flows,1 especially to developing countries. As has been documented by many studies, different
forms of financial flows differ remarkably in their behaviors. First, foreign direct investment (FDI)
appears to be dramatically less volatile than other forms of capital flows.2 This pattern has been
more apparent in developing countries, especially during many crisis episodes in the 1990s such as
the Mexican crisis of 1994-95 and the Asian crises of 1997-98. Furthermore, FDI flows substantially
increased while other flows were subjected to large reversals during crises involving no default by
the country’s government on its debts or no imposition of capital controls.3 Moreover, there has
been growing evidence on the impacts of good governance and institutions on the composition and
volatility of a country’s capital flows. Specifically, the share of FDI in total flows tends to be higher
for countries that have higher risk, a lower level of financial development, and weaker institutions.4
Despite these distinctive behaviors of FDI, only a small body of literature has jointly incor-
porated FDI together with other types of flows in a general equilibrium model. This chapter,
therefore, develops a theory of international capital flows aiming at filling this gap. However, since
this chapter abstracts from the government sector, it can only explain the pattern of FDI during
crisis periods in the absence of capital controls or sovereign defaults. In particular, it attempts at
accounting for an increase in the fraction of FDI in total inflows during a deteriorating economic
condition of the recipient country, while the level of FDI may increase during the same time that
other flows decline.
The framework proposed is one of informational asymmetry between foreign investors and
agents in the recipient countries of capital flows. In this model there are two types of asymmetric
information frictions. The first is idiosyncratic and specific to each local manager. In the model
heterogenous local managers differ in terms of the difficulty at which they can be monitored early on
in the production process (information friction). The other friction is a country-wide phenomenon
where managers can steal a fraction of the output left in the firm for their own benefits later in
the production process (agency friction). This description of the asymmetric information frictions
is similar to Atkeson and Cole (2005) and will be explained in more detail in Section 2.
FDI differs from other types of international capital flows, which are simply referred to in this
model as portfolio investments, because it can help foreign investors overcome these informational
problems. Direct investors acquire management expertise specific to the local market so that they
gain a direct influence on the management and are better informed about the firm. Portfolio in-
vestors, on the other hand, can gain insight about the firm and prevent managers’ stealing only if
1International capital flows as classified by the IMF and the OECD, consist of three categories: direct investment,
portfolio investment, and other investments. According to Lipsey (1999), the concept of lasting interest and a
significant influence on management has become an emphasis of the IMF’s and the OECD’s current definition of
direct investment. In their classification, foreign direct investment (FDI) includes an investment by a foreign investor
with an ownership of more than 10 percent of a local firm while the remaining investment into local firms’ equity is
classified as portfolio investment. In addition to equity securities, portfolio investment includes corporate securities
such as bonds and money market instruments. The third category, other investments, covers transactions in currency
and deposits, trade credit, and loans.
2For a summary, see Albuquerque (2003). See also Lipsey (1999, 2001).
3For the crisis in Mexico and the crises in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, FDI continued without interruption or
even accelerated. During the crises in Indonesia and Malaysia, on the other hand, FDI was also subject to reversals.
This empirical evidence is detailed in Appendix B.
4See Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000), Albuquerque (2003), Alfaro et al. (2007) and Leuz et al. (2008).
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they pay monitoring costs. As the monitoring costs vary across managers, while the management
costs do not, the optimal choice of contract will depend on whom the foreign investors are hiring.
Given the distribution of the monitoring costs across manager, this tradeoff determines the compo-
sition of a country’s international capital flows. Specifically, foreign investors hiring managers who
are very difficult to monitor will optimally choose direct investment as they are better off paying
management costs. Foreign investors who hire easy to monitor managers, on the contrary, find
portfolio investment to be the optimal choice as the costs of management will dominate the costs of
asymmetric information. As a consequence, there will be a cutoff level of the managers’ monitoring
costs below which portfolio investment is the optimal investment choice and above which direct
investment is the optimal decision. The main analysis of the model will be to analyze how this
cutoff and the amount of investment of each type changes with economic conditions in the country.
Hence, the model will not only give implications on the composition of international capital flows
when a country experiences a crisis, but also offer predictions regarding the cross-country charac-
teristics of FDI share. The model predicts that FDI share will be larger in countries which have a
lower level of corporate governance.
Other papers that incorporate the composition of FDI and other types of capital flows ad-
dress different kinds of tradeoff among different types of flows. The tradeoff between management
efficiency and liquidity is emphasized in Goldstein and Razin (2006). They assume that foreign in-
vestors differ in terms of how likely they are to experience a liquidity shock forcing them to sell their
firm prematurely. In their model, the productivity level is realized before an investment decision is
made. Direct investors have the advantage of being more informed about the firm, thus allowing
them to manage the project more efficiently. This, however, leads to a lower resell price in case
they need to sell their projects for liquidity reasons due to the lemon type asymmetric information
problem between the investors and the potential buyers. As a result of this tradeoff, in equilibrium
foreign investors with higher probability of liquidity needs will more likely choose portfolio invest-
ment instead of FDI. Given this result, they are able to explain the higher rates of withdrawals of
portfolio investment. In addition, under the hypothesis that the cost of production and the level of
transparency are lower in developing countries, a larger share of FDI in these countries is predicted.
Nonetheless, their model does not address the change in the pattern and composition of capital
flows as economic conditions of the recipient country change, which is a major emphasis in this
chapter.
Another paper that addresses the composition of international capital flows to developing
countries is Albuquerque (2003). The key feature in this paper is the assumption that financial
contracts cannot be perfectly enforced as foreign investment are subject to the risk of expropriation
by agents in the recipient countries. The advantage of direct investment is that FDI is harder to
expropriate as it requires intangible assets of the multinational company while other types of flows
are fully appropriable. Given this difference in the degree of inalienability, the model implies that
financially constrained countries receive a larger share of international capital in the form of FDI
as the risks associated with FDI is lower than those of other flows. However, since both types of
flows always move in the same direction in this model, it cannot explain the rise in FDI flows as
opposed to the fall in other flows during crises as observed in many developing countries.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The details of the model and the contracting
problem are presented in Sections 2 and 3. Section 4 analyzes the implications of the model on the
optimal composition of international capital flows when economic conditions in the host country
change. The model is solved numerically for various parameter values. The summary of the
numerical exercises are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and discusses the implications of
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the model. All proofs of the propositions in the chapter and the empirical evidence on international
capital flows for each individual crisis countries during the 1990s are provided in the appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The Environment
The model economy is a small open economy. Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, ..
and there are three subperiods in each period. There is a continuum of infinite-lived heterogenous
domestic agents/managers, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], with measure one and a large number of foreign
investors.
There are two types of non-storable goods, the internationally tradable and the internationally
nontradable goods. The tradable good is the numeraire and can be bought or sold in any amount
in the international market at the world price, normalized to one. The nontradable good can only
be produced in the domestic economy using the tradable good and labor of local agents.
Each local manager is endowed with the same amount of the tradable good yt each period and
none of the nontradable good. The endowment yt is strictly positive and iid over time. The local
managers are risk-neutral, supply labor inelastically, and derive utility only from the consumption of
the nontradable good, while risk-neutral foreign investors only derive utility from the consumption
of the tradable good.
For simplicity, only foreign investors are assumed to own the technology to produce the non-
tradable good even though the model can also be interpreted as foreign investors having more
productive technology than local agents. To take advantage of this investment opportunity, foreign
investors buy the tradable good from the international market, hire a local manager to run the
firm, and then sell the output in the local market. The relative price of the nontradable in terms of
the tradable in this local market is denoted by qt. This production process, however, is subjected
to asymmetric information between the foreign investors and the local managers. All foreign in-
vestors are alike, but local managers are heterogeneous in terms of the severity of the asymmetric
information problem which will be described in more detail below. This specific characteristic of
the manager j is publicly observable at the time of the hiring.
2.2 The Investment Contract
At the beginning of each period, a foreign investor and a local manager which are randomly matched
sign an investment contract which is one period in length and renegotiable every period. Due to
the heterogeneity of the managers, the resulting efficient contract signed will potentially differ from
one another. For now the index j and t are dropped when describing the general setup of the
investment contract.
The description of asymmetric information frictions between the investors and managers is
similar to that of Atkeson and Cole (2005). An investment of the tradable good, i ≥ 0, is made in
the first subperiod, yielding an output of the nontradable good of θG(i) in the second subperiod.
θ is the productivity level, G(i) = iκl1−κ, κ < 1, and l = 1 is inelastically supplied by the manager.
The productivity shock is i.i.d. across time and project with cumulative distribution function P ,
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density p, and a nonnegative support Θ. In this subperiod, θ is realized and observed only by the
manager. After the manager makes a report θ̂ and the investor makes a monitoring decision m(θ̂)
(information friction), the manager makes a payment v to the investor contingent on the report and
the monitoring decision. Let m(θ̂) denote the indicator function that specify the investor’s decision
to monitor, then m(θ̂) = 1 if monitoring occurs and 0 otherwise. Let M ⊆ Θ denote the set of
reports in which monitoring takes place i.e. m(θ̂) = 1 for θ̂ ∈M . Let v0(θ̂) denote the payment as
a function of the report θ̂ in case monitoring does not take place and v1(θ̂, θ) denote the payment
as a function of the report θ̂ and the actual θ in case monitoring does take place.
At the end of the second subperiod, the manager can steal a fraction τ of whatever output he
has not paid to the investor (agency friction). Otherwise, that output is reinvested in the firm with
the gross return between the second and third subperiods of one. In the third subperiod, θ and
the manager’s stealing decision become publicly available. The manager receives a compensation
of x(θ̂, θ) from the investor if no stealing occurs and receives nothing otherwise. The timeline of
the contract is shown in Figure 1.
The one-period investment contract between an investor and a manager is, therefore, a level
of investment i to be installed in the first subperiod, a decision to monitor m and a payment made
to the investor v in the second subperiod, and a compensation x from the investor to the manager
in the third subperiod.
Each contract will be designed in such a way that the manager will never misreport or steal.
For reasons of limited liability (LL), we require that the amount of payment v is feasible given the
report θ̂ and the monitoring decision, and that the worst thing that foreign investors can do at the
end of the third subperiod is not giving any compensation to the manager.
∀θ̂ /∈M, v0(θ̂) ≤ θ̂G(i); ∀θ̂ ∈M, v1(θ̂, θ) ≤ θG(i), and ∀θ̂, θ, x(θ̂, θ) ≥ 0 (LL)
Given the risk neutrality of the manager, to guarantee that the manager will not steal in the
second subperiod, x(θ̂, θ) must be made high enough such that the manager prefers to receive x(θ̂, θ)
instead of stealing. Thus, the no-stealing constraints (NS) require that
∀θ̂ /∈M, x(θ̂, θ) ≥ τ [θG(i)− v0(θ̂)] and θ̂ feasible given θ and v0 (NS)
∀θ̂ ∈M, x(θ̂, θ) ≥ τ [θG(i)− v1(θ̂, θ)]
where θ̂ is feasible given θ and v0 if either θ̂ ∈ M, or θ̂ /∈ M and v0(θ̂) ≤ θG(i). In other
words, a report θ̂ is feasible if it leads to monitoring, or the manager has enough resources to make
payment v0(θ̂) if θ̂ /∈M .
Given the risk neutrality of the manager, he will not misreport θ if x(θ, θ) satisfies the incentive
constraints (IC) below.
∀θ ∈ Θ, x(θ, θ) ≥ x(θ̂, θ) ∀ feasible θ̂ given θ and v0 (IC)
Furthermore, if the manager has an outside opportunity, delivering him utility U0, besides
working for the foreign investor, the manager will agree on the terms of the contract as long as the
expected payment specified in the contract satisfies the individual rationality constraint (IR).∫
x(θ, θ)dP (θ) ≥ U0 (IR)
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However, due to the assumption that only the foreign investors own the production technology
of the nontradable good, the manager’s reservation utility is equal to zero. This assumption greatly
simplifies the rest of the analysis.
Assumption 2.1: U0 = 0
There are two types of investment available for foreign investors in each period, direct invest-
ment and portfolio investment. If the investors choose direct investment, they can gain insight in
the firm and observe the firm’s productivity θ in the second subperiod, but they have to pay the
costs of acquiring management expertise specific to the local market, assumed to be a fraction of
the realized production. Denote this fraction by λ where 0 < λ < 1 which yields the total man-
agement costs of λθG(i). This can be interpreted as direct investors always being able to monitor
θ in the second subperiod without further monitoring costs. As will be shown later, this type of
investment helps eliminate problems of information and agency frictions. Portfolio investors, on
the other hand, can choose to monitor θ in the second subperiod if they pay a fixed cost of γj . This
fixed cost γj is specific to the manager j and publicly observable. The distribution of γj among
the local managers is assumed to be uniform with a nonnegative support Γ and a cumulative dis-
tribution function µ(γj). As these monitoring costs vary across managers, while the management
costs do not, the optimal choice of contract will depend on whom the foreign investors are hiring.
The characteristics of each type of investment contracts will be shown in the next section.
Since each financial contract is one period in length and renegotiable every period, the analysis
of the contract can be separated from the rest of the model and the general equilibrium conditions
only affect the contract through the relative price of the nontradable, denoted by qt. In each period,
depending on the relative price qt the foreign investor who hires the manager with the potential
monitoring costs γj chooses the type of investment to maximize his expected returns
max{V D(qt, γj), V P (qt, γj)}
where V D(qt, γj) denotes the expected value of an efficient direct investment contract when the
relative price is qt and the potential costs of monitoring is γj , while V P (qt, γj) is similarly defined as
the expected value of an efficient portfolio investment contract given qt and γj . The derivations of
both value functions are shown in the next section. Foreign investors will choose direct investment
if V D(qt, γj) > V P (qt, γj), choose portfolio investment when V D(qt, γj) < V P (qt, γj), and are
indifferent between the two types of investment when V D(qt, γj) = V P (qt, γj). Let ZDjt denote
the indicator function that specifies the decision to become a direct investor, then ZDjt = 1 if
V D(qt, γj) > V P (qt, γj) and 0 otherwise. After choosing the type of investment, all the conditions of
the efficient investment contract are implemented including the investment level ijt, the monitoring
decisionsmjt(θ̂) ∀θ̂ ∈ Θ, the payments in the second subperiod
{
v0,jt(θ̂) and v1,jt(θ̂, θ) ∀θ̂, θ ∈ Θ
}
,
and the compensation to the manager xjt(θ̂, θ) ∀θ̂, θ ∈ Θ. The analysis made in this chapter will
be to analyze how this decision of each investor changes with varying economic conditions through
the changes in qt.
2.3 Equilibrium
Since both types of goods are non-storable, agents have no intertemporal saving technology, and
all financial contracts are only one-period in length, the economy’s environment is indeed static;
all agents in this model solve a static maximization problem. Given that the financial contracts
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are designed in such a way that the manager will never misreport or steal, an equilibrium in this
model economy is defined only in terms of the actual realization of the firms’ productivity θ not on
the report θ̂.
An equilibrium is a sequence of prices of the nontradable good {qt}∞t=0, a sequence of for-
eign investors’ decision on types of investment
{
ZDjt
}∞
t=0
, investment level {ijt}∞t=0, monitoring
{mjt(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ}∞t=0, payments in the second subperiod {v0,jt(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ}∞t=0 and {v1,jt(θ, θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ}∞t=0,
and compensation to the manager {xjt(θ, θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ}∞t=0, and a sequence of local agents’ allocation
{ljt, cjt(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ}∞t=0 for all γj ∈ Γ, j ∈ [0, 1] such that
1. foreign investors choose the type of investment contract to maximize their expected returns:
- for all t and j, given prices qt and the properties of each type of investment contract, foreign
investors who hires a manager with potential monitoring costs of γj chooses the type of investment
to solve
max{V D(qt, γj), V P (qt, γj)}
where ZDjt = 1 if V
D(qt, γj) > V P (qt, γj) and 0 otherwise. The investment level ijt, the monitoring
decisions mjt(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ, the payments in the second subperiod v0,jt(θ) and v1,jt(θ, θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ, and
the compensation to the manager xjt(θ, θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ are implemented as specified by the efficient
investment contract.
2. all local managers maximize utility subject to their budget constraint:
- for all t, given prices qt, the endowment processes yt, and the compensation xjt(θ, θ) ∀θ ∈
Θ specified by the contract with the foreign investor, the local manager j who supplies labor
inelastically chooses the level of consumption cjt(θ) depending on the current period realization of
θ to solve
max Et
∞∑
t=0
βtcjt(θ)
s.t. qtcjt(θ) = yt + qtxjt(θ, θ)
ljt ≤ 1, cjt(θ) ≥ 0
3. the labor market clears: ∀j, t ljt = 1; and
4. the nontradable good market clears i.e. the aggregate domestic consumption must be equal
to the aggregate production after the management costs and monitoring costs by foreign investors,
assuming the law of large numbers: ∀j, t∫
γj
∫
θ
cjt(θ)dP (θ)dµ(γj) =
∫
γj
∫
θ
[
θG(ijt)− ZDjtλθG(ijt)−
[
1− ZDjt
]
γjmjt(θ)
]
dP (θ)dµ(γj)
3 Efficient Investment Contract Decision
In this section, an investment contract of each investment type is characterized. Given the relative
price of the nontradable qt, an efficient contract between a foreign investor and a manager is a
contract that maximizes the expected return to the foreign investor subject to the limited liability
constraints (LL), the no-stealing constraints (NS), the incentive constraints (IC), and the manager’s
individual rationality constraint (IR).
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3.1 An Efficient Direct Investment Contract
Since under a direct investment contract, foreign investors pay only the costs of management but
no monitoring costs, their optimal monitoring decision is to always monitor. Therefore, for all qt
and γj , m(θ̂; qt, γj) = 1 for all θ̂ ∈ Θ or, in other words, M(qt, γj) = Θ. As a result, the only
relevant payment to investors in the second subperiod is v1(θ̂, θ; qt, γj).
Given the above characteristic, the expected value of an efficient direct investment contract,
denoted by V D(qt, γj), must be independent of γj . In particular, an efficient direct investment
contract must maximize the expected return to a direct investor, after the management costs
λθG(ijt) and the compensation to the manager are paid, subject to the limited liability constraints
(LL), the no-stealing constraints (NS), the incentive constraints (IC), and the manager’s individual
rationality constraint (IR). Thus, V D(qt, γj) must be equal to the expected value of the contract
that is a solution of the problem (P1) below.
Given qt and γj , a direct investor chooses x(θ̂, θ; qt, γj) and v1(θ̂, θ; qt, γj) for all ∀θ̂, θ ∈ Θ, and
i(qt, γj) ≥ 0 to solve
(P1) max qt
∫ {[1− λ]θG(ijt) −xjt(θ, θ)}dP (θ)− ijt
s.t. [LL] ∀θ̂, v1,jt(θ̂, θ) ≤ θG(ijt)
xjt(θ̂, θ) ≥ 0
[IC] ∀θ, xjt(θ, θ) ≥ xjt(θ̂, θ) ∀ feasible θ̂ given θ and v0,jt
[NS] ∀θ̂, xjt(θ̂, θ) ≥ τ [θG(ijt)− v1,jt(θ̂, θ)]
[IR]
∫
xjt(θ, θ)dP (θ) ≥ U0
Proposition 1 presents properties of an efficient direct investment contract. Since direct in-
vestors always observe the productivity level θ, an efficient contract must demand the highest
possible payment in the second subperiod to prevent the manager from stealing and specify the
lowest possible compensation to manager in the third subperiod when he misreports as these will
relax the incentive constraints and the no-stealing constraints as much as possible without affecting
the investor’s expected return. In addition, the manager’s individual rationality constraint must
be binding and, thus, there is an optimal contract which specifies a constant compensation to the
manager xjt(θ, θ) = U0, which by Assumption 2.1 is equal to zero as the manager has no outside
option.
Proposition 1. There is an efficient direct investment contract with the following properties:
(i) ∀θ̂, θ v1,jt(θ̂, θ) = θG(ijt) and xjt(θ̂, θ) = 0 for θ̂ 6= θ; and (ii) ∀θ, xjt(θ, θ) = U0
The proof of the proposition is shown in the Appendix A. The approach taken in the proof is
to show that there is a contract with the above properties that satisfies the same set of constraints
as those in (P1) and delivers the same expected payoff to both the foreign investor and the local
manager. Given the above properties of an efficient contract, the problem of a direct investor is
now simply to choose the level of investment i(qt, γj) to solve the following problem:
max
ijt≥0
qt
∫
{[1− λ]θG(ijt)}dP (θ)− ijt
Let θ˜ denote the average level of the firm’s productivity, θ˜ ≡ ∫ θdP (θ), then the optimal level of
direct investment iDjt ≡ iD(qt, γj) must satisfy the first-order condition qt[1− λ]θ˜G′(iDjt) = 1. With
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the functional form of the production function G(i) = iκ, then under an efficient direct investment
contract, the optimal level of investment and the expected value of the contract are:
iD(qt, γj) =
[
κqt[1− λ]θ˜
]1/[1−κ]
and (1)
V D(qt, γj) = qt[1− λ]θ˜G(iDjt)− iDjt = [
1
κ
− 1]iDjt
Clearly, iD(qt, γj) and V D(qt, γj) are strictly positive, independent of γj , and strictly increasing
in qt. In particular,
∂iD(qt,γj)
∂qt
= 1[1−κ]qt i
D(qt, γj) and
∂V D(qt,γj)
∂qt
= 1κqt i
D(qt, γj).
3.2 An Efficient Portfolio Investment Contract
First, I characterize the first-best contract, which is an efficient contract when there is neither
the information friction nor agency friction. Then, I characterize an efficient portfolio investment
contract with the presence of the two frictions specified and identifies the circumstances under
which a first-best outcome is achievable. As in the case of a direct investment contract, general
equilibrium conditions only affect the contracting problem through qt, the relative price of the
nontradable good.
3.2.1 The First-Best Environment
In this environment the productivity parameter θ is publicly observable and managers cannot
steal; thus, the contracting problem become independent of the monitoring costs γj . For similar
reasons as those in the direct investment contracting problem, a first-best contract must specify
the lowest possible compensation to the manager when he misreports and the manager’s individual
rationality constraint must be binding. Given these properties, there must be a first-best contract
with a constant compensation to the manager xt(θ, θ) = xFB = U0, and as a result the investment
level specified by a first-best contract must be the solution to
max
ijt≥0
qt
∫
θG(it)dP (θ)− it
In other words, the optimal level of investment iFBt ≡ iFB(qt, γj) must satisfy the first-order
condition qtθ˜G′(iFBt ) = 1. With the functional form of the production function that I have,
iFB(qt, γj) =
[
κqtθ˜
]1/[1−κ]
and (2)
V FB(qt, γj) = qt
[∫
{θG(iFBt )− xFB}dP (θ)
]
− iFBt = [
1
κ
− 1]iFBt
Clearly, V FB(qt, γj) > V D(qt, γj) for all γj and qt, and they only differ in terms of the costs of
management λ. It is straightforward to show that for the case that both investors and managers
are risk neutral, the first-best outcome is always attainable when only one type of the two frictions
is present. As will be shown in the next subsection, with the two types of frictions and U0 = 0, the
first-best outcome is not attainable for strictly positive monitoring costs γj > 0.
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3.2.2 Contracting with Information and Agency Frictions
This subsection presents properties of an efficient portfolio investment contract when there are both
information and agency frictions. In this environment, an efficient portfolio investment contract
must maximize the expected return to an investor, after the monitoring costs and the compensation
to the manager, are paid subject to the limited liability constraints (LL), the no-stealing constraints
(NS), the incentive constraints (IC), and the manager’s individual rationality constraint (IR). The
expected value of an efficient portfolio investment, denoted by V P (qt, γj), is given by the expected
value of an efficient contract that is a solution of the problem (P2) described below.
Given qt and γj , a portfolio investor chooses for all θ̂, θ ∈ Θ, mjt(θ̂; qt, γj), x(θ̂, θ; qt, γj),
v0(θ̂; qt, γj), and v1(θ̂, θ; qt, γj), and i(qt, γj) ≥ 0 to solve
(P2) max qt
[∫ {θG(ijt)− xjt(θ, θ)}dP (θ)− ∫ γjmjt(θ̂)dP (θ)]− ijt
s.t. [LL] ∀θ̂ /∈Mjt, v0,jt(θ̂) ≤ θ̂G(ijt)
∀θ̂ ∈Mjt, v1,jt(θ̂, θ) ≤ θG(ijt)
xjt(θ̂, θ) ≥ 0
[IC] ∀θ ∈ Θ, xjt(θ, θ) ≥ xjt(θ̂, θ) ∀ feasible θ̂ given θ and v0,jt
[NS] ∀θ̂ /∈Mjt, xjt(θ̂, θ) ≥ τ [θG(ijt)− v0,jt(θ̂)] ∀ feasible θ̂ given θ and v0,jt
∀θ̂ ∈Mjt, xjt(θ̂, θ) ≥ τ [θG(ijt)− v1,jt(θ̂, θ)]
[IR]
∫
xjt(θ, θ)dP (θ) ≥ U0
where m(θ̂) = 1 for θ̂ ∈M .
The properties of an efficient portfolio investment contract that solves (P2) are characterized in
series of propositions, proofs of which can be found in Appendix A. The approach taken throughout
is to show that there is a contract with the proposed properties that satisfies the same set of
constraints as those in (P2) and delivers the same expected payoff to both the foreign investor and
the local manager.
Proposition 2. There is an efficient portfolio investment contract with the following properties:
(i) ∀θ̂ ∈Mjt, v1,jt(θ̂, θ) = θG(ijt) and xjt(θ̂, θ) = 0 for θ̂ 6= θ;
(ii) ∀θ̂ /∈Mjt, v0,jt(θ̂) = θMjt G(ijt) and xjt(θ̂, θ) = τ [θ−θMjt ]G(ijt) for θ̂ 6= θ where θMjt = inf
θ/∈Mjt
θ;
and
(iii) Mjt = [0, θMjt ]
By Proposition 2, the monitoring set of an efficient contract must be the lower region of Θ
which means that only if the manager reports a low enough productivity level, will the monitoring
by the investor occur. In this case, the contract specifies that the investor confiscates all the
production in the second subperiod and the manager receives the lowest possible compensation in
the third subperiod if he misreports. For a high enough productivity report, on the other hand,
monitoring will not occur and an incentive compatible contract will require a uniform payment from
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the manager to the investor in the second subperiod. An efficient contract requires the uniform
payment as otherwise the manager will have an incentive to misreport in order to retain as much
output in the firm as possible without being monitored. In this case, an incentive compatible
contract specifies compensation to the manager equal to the amount of output that he would be
able to steal if he misreports.
Using the above results, the problem for a portfolio investor given qt and γj is now to choose
the upper bound of the monitoring set θMjt , the manager’s compensation xjt(θ, θ), and the level of
investment ijt ≥ 0 to solve the following problem.
(P3) max qt
[∫ {θG(ijt)− xjt(θ, θ)}dP (θ)− γjP (θMjt )]− ijt
s.t. [LL] ∀θ ∈ Θ, xjt(θ, θ) ≥ 0
[IC] ∀θ ∈ Θ, xjt(θ, θ) ≥ xjt(θ̂, θ) ∀ feasible θ̂ given θ and v0,jt
[NS] ∀θ /∈Mjt, xjt(θ, θ) ≥ τ [θ − θMjt ]G(ijt)
[IR]
∫
xjt(θ, θ)dP (θ) ≥ U0
Given the risk-neutrality of the manager, we can further focus on the set of contracts that have
a relatively simple compensation structure. Proposition 3 shows that there is an efficient contract
that specifies no compensation to the manager if the firm’s productivity is low while giving the
manager a fraction τ of the output not paid out in the second subperiod if the firm is productive
enough. This compensation scheme is the lowest possible that satisfies the no-stealing constraints
and is incentive compatible. When no monitoring occurs, the manager’s compensation increases
with the firm’s productivity and is equal to the fraction τ of the output after the uniform payment
v0,jt(θ) = θMjt G(ijt) is paid.
Proposition 3. There is an efficient portfolio investment contract with the following properties:
(i) ∀θ ∈Mjt, xjt(θ, θ) = 0; and
(ii) ∀θ /∈Mjt, xjt(θ, θ) = τ [θ − θMjt ]G(ijt)
By Proposition 3, the portfolio investor’s problem is completely characterized by θMjt and ijt
and becomes
(P4) max
θMjt ,ijt≥0
qt
∫ θG(ijt)dP (θ)− ∫
θMjt
τ [θ − θMjt ]G(ijt)dP (θ)− γjP (θMjt )
− ijt
s.t. [IR]
∫
θMjt
τ [θ − θMjt ]G(ijt)dP (θ) ≥ U0
Notice that there is a tradeoff between the information rent
∫
θMjt
τ [θ − θMjt ]G(ijt)dP (θ) and the
monitoring costs γjP (θMjt ). As the monitoring set is reduced, the costs of monitoring decline.
However, in order for the contract to be incentive compatible, the uniform payment, for the cases
not involving monitoring, must also be lower. This, due to the agency friction, increases the
costs to the investors in terms of the compensation to the manager as it increases the amount
of output left in the firm at the end of the second subperiod. Therefore, only in the case that
γj = 0 will the monitoring set Mjt become the set Θ for all qt. For γj > 0, due to the above
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tradeoff, the no-monitoring set will never be empty, implying that the expected compensation for
the manager,
∫
θMjt
τ [θ − θMjt ]G(ijt)dP (θ), will strictly be positive. Thus, with U0 = 0, the individual
rationality constraint of the above problem will not be binding unless γj = 0 as in this case the
portfolio investors always monitor, leaving no information rent to the manager. Therefore, only
in this case, will the first-best outcome be attainable. Let iPM (qt, γ
j) and V PM (qt, γ
j) denote the
portfolio investor’s optimal investment level and expected value from an efficient contract that
involves monitoring. Then iPM (qt, γ
j = 0) = iFB(qt) and V PM (qt, γ
j = 0) = V FB(qt). Since the
individual rationality constraint does not bind for the case of strictly positive monitoring costs,
γj > 0, the optimal level of investment and monitoring decisions are completely characterized by
the two first-order conditions of the unconstrained problem of (P4):
ijt : qt
θ˜ − ∫
θMjt
τ [θ − θMjt ]dP (θ)
G′(ijt) = 1, ijt > 0
θMjt : τG(ijt)[1− P (θMjt )] ≤ γjp(θMjt ) and θMjt ≥ 0
There are two possibilities; an efficient contract may or may not involve monitoring depending
on the price of the output qt and the potential monitoring costs γj . For any given qt, it may be
optimal for a portfolio investor not to monitor at all, i.e. θMjt = 0 andMjt = ∅, if γj is high enough.
This may also be the case if qt is low enough because as qt declines, more portfolio investors will find
monitoring to be too costly relative to the value of the output. On the contrary, for low enough γj
or high enough qt, portfolio investors will find monitoring optimal; an efficient contract will involve
monitoring with positive probability.
Let iPN (qt, γ
j) and V PN (qt, γ
j) denote the portfolio investor’s investment level and expected value
from the contract when monitoring is not optimal. In this case the level of investment and the
expected return to the investor will be independent of γj . In particular, for the case of nonnegative
support of Θ, iPN,jt ≡ iPN (qt, γj) must satisfy qt
[
[1− τ ]θ˜
]
G′(iPN,jt) = 1.
5 Given the functional form
of the production function,
iPN (qt, γ
j) =
[
κqt[1− τ ]θ˜
]1/[1−κ]
(3)
V PN (qt, γ
j) = qt
∫
[1− τ ]θG(iPN,jt)dP (θ)− iPN,jt = [
1
κ
− 1]iPN,jt
Clearly, iPN (qt, γ
j) and V PN (qt, γ
j) are strictly positive, strictly increasing in qt, and independent
of γj . Also, V PN (qt, γ
j) < V FB(qt) for any qt and γj , and they only differ in terms of the stealing
fraction τ . In order to guarantee that the solution to this model economy is not trivial and that
foreign investors will not always find a portfolio investment more profitable than a direct investment,
we assume that the expected value of a portfolio investment in this case is below that of a direct
investment. For the case of nonnegative support of Θ, assuming that τ > λ will ensure this
analysis.6 With this assumption, the comparison of (1) and (3) clearly indicates that V PN (qt, γ
j)
5If Θ = [θmin,∞) and θmin > 0, this condition becomes qt
"eθ − R
θmin
τ [θ − θmin]dP (θ)
#
G′(iPN,jt) = 1 or
qt
h
(1− τ) eθ + τθminiG′(iPN,jt) = 1
6If θ ∈ [θmin,∞) and θmin > 0, this assumption becomes (1− τ) eθ + τθmin < (1− λ) eθ.
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< V D(qt, γj) for all qt and γj . This assumption, therefore, guarantees that for the case of high
enough γj or a low enough qt, foreign investors will find a direct investment to give higher expected
return that a portfolio investment.
Assumption 2.2: τ > λ
For the other case where monitoring is optimal i.e. θMjt > 0, the two first-order conditions
must hold with equality. Let iPM,jt ≡ iPM (qt, γj) and θPM,jt ≡ θPM (qt, γj) denote the optimal level
of investment and the optimal upper bound of the monitoring set in this case, respectively. The
expected value of an efficient portfolio investment contract involving monitoring is, therefore, equal
to
V PM (i
P
M,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j) = qt
∫
θG(iPM,jt)dP (θ)− qt
∫
θPM,jt
τ [θ − θPM,jt]G(iPM,jt)dP (θ)
−qtγjP (θPM,jt)− iPM,jt
where iPM,jt and θ
P
M,jt are solutions to the nonlinear systems of the two first-order conditions
below.
F 1(iPM,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j) = qt
θ˜ − ∫
θPM,jt
τ [θ − θPM,jt]dP (θ)
G′(iPM,jt)− 1 = 0
F 2(iPM,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j) = qtτG(iPM,jt)[1− P (θPM,jt)]− qtγjp(θPM,jt) = 0
As can be seen, the solutions to these systems will depend on the distribution of θ on Θ.
For the case of a uniform distribution function, the solutions to these systems can be derived and
some of interesting properties of the model economy in terms of the levels and the composition of
international capital flows can be solved analytically.
4 The Case of Uniformly Distributed Firm’s Productivity
4.1 Contracting with Information and Agency Frictions
Assume that firm’s productivity level is uniformly distributed with a nonnegative support Θ =
[θmin, θmax]. 7 For simplicity, it is assumed that θmin = 0; the analysis is very similar for the
case that θmin > 0. To guarantee the uniqueness of solutions to the portfolio investor’s problem,
I make another assumption regarding the value of the production function and stealing fraction
parameters.
Assumption 2.3: 1−κ1+κ > τ
Assumption 2.3 gives a sufficient condition that the solutions iPM (qt, γ
j) and θPM (qt, γ
j) to
the nonlinear systems above will be the unique solution to the portfolio investor’s maximization
7In this case for all θ, p(θ) = 1
θmax−θmin , P (θ) =
θ−θmin
θmax−θmin , and
eθ ≡ R θdP (θ) = θmax−θmin
2
.
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problem.8 Since V PM (i
P
M,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j) is continuously differentiable in every arguments and the
solutions are unique, iPM (qt, γ
j) and θPM (qt, γ
j) are continuously differentiable in qt and γj .
The proof that the Hessian matrix of the objective function of the unconstrained maximization
problem of (P4), D2V PM (i
P
M,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j), is negative definite is shown in Appendix A. Proposition
4 analyzes how the optimal investment level, the monitoring decisions, and the optimal value of an
efficient portfolio investment contract involving monitoring vary with the price of the nontradable
good qt and the monitoring characteristic of the manager, γj . In particular, Proposition4 shows
that iPM (qt, γ
j), θPM (qt, γ
j), and V PM (i
P
M,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j) are all strictly increasing in qt and strictly
decreasing in γj .
Proposition 4. If θ is uniformly distributed and Assumption 3 holds, the optimal portfolio invest-
ment level and the upper bound of the monitoring set have the following properties:
(i)∂i
P
M (qt,γ
j)
∂qt
> 0 and ∂i
P
M (qt,γ
j)
∂γj
< 0;
(ii) ∂θ
P
M (qt,γ
j)
∂qt
> 0 and ∂θ
P
M (qt,γ
j)
∂γj
< 0; and
(iii)
∂V PM (i
P
M,jt,θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j)
∂qt
> 0 and
∂V PM (i
P
M,jt,θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j)
∂γj
< 0.
As qt increases, portfolio investors will increase both the investment level and the size of the
monitoring set simultaneously in order to take advantage of a higher return from producing each
unit of output and to reduce the incentive of the managers to steal and misreport. Together, as
the level of investment and the size of the monitoring set vary optimally, the expected value of the
contract to the foreign investors also increases.
On the other hand, for any given price of the output qt, portfolio investors who hire managers
with higher γj will find monitoring less beneficial and are more willing to give higher information
rent
∫
θPM,jt
τ [θ−θPM,jt]G(iPM,jt) to the manager instead of paying the monitoring costs. Since the costs
of asymmetric information frictions are all in units of the output, this change reduces the rate of
the return from investment. Therefore, these investors will optimally choose lower investment level
leading to lower expected value of the contract.
Given the functional form of the production function and the two first-order conditions of the
investor’s problem, which hold with equality, the optimal monitoring set θPM,jt must satisfy the
following condition:
qtτ
κqt
θ˜ − ∫
θPM,jt
τ [θ − θPM,jt]dP (θ)


κ
1−κ
[1− P (θPM,jt)]− qtγjp(θPM,jt) = 0
As a result, the optimal investment level and the expected value of an efficient portfolio in-
vestment contract in this case can be defined in terms of θPM,jt as follows:
8For the case that θmin > 0, this assumption becomes
h
θmax−θmin
θmax
i2
1−κ
[1+κ]
> τ, which requires lower levels of the
stealing fraction.
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iPM (qt, γ
j) =
κqt
θ˜ − ∫
θPM,jt
τ [θ − θPM,jt]dP (θ)


1
1−κ
(4)
V PM (qt, γ
j) = qt

θ˜ − ∫
θPM,jt
τ [θ − θPM,jt]dP (θ)
G(iPM,jt)− γjP (θPM,jt)
− iPM,jt
=
[
1
κ
− 1
]
iPM,jt − qtγjP (θPM,jt)
In particular, as shown in the proof of Proposition 4,
∂V PM (i
P
M,jt,θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j)
∂qt
= 1κqt i
P
M,jt −
γjP (θPM,jt). By Proposition 4, the strictly negative relationship between θ
P
M,jt and γ
j implies
that as γj varies from a value close to zero, the size of the monitoring set strictly declines from that
close to the whole set Θ, and as γj becomes high enough θPM,jt declines to that close to the lower
bound and this holds true for any level of qt. In other words, by the results of Proposition 4, as the
monitoring costs varies, the optimal monitoring set as well as the optimal level of investment iPM,jt
and the expected value of an efficient contract V PM ( qt, γ
j) will strictly decline from those close to
the first-best levels to those close to the case of a portfolio investment with no monitoring. This
can be seen by comparing (4) with (2) and (3) as θPM,jt approaches the upper bound of Θ or zero,
respectively.
4.2 Optimal Choice of Investment Contracts
From the previous subsection, V PM ( qt, γ
j) is strictly decreasing in γj and it varies from the first-
best level V FB(qt) for very low γj to that of the no-monitoring case V PN (qt, γ
j) for high enough
γj . Since for all qt and γj , V FB(qt) > V D(qt, γj) while V PN (qt, γ
j) < V D(qt, γj), there must be
a unique and strictly positive cutoff level of monitoring costs, γ∗ for each qt, such that a foreign
investor who hires manager with this monitoring characteristics will be indifferent between the a
direct investment contract and a portfolio investment contract. In other words, this cutoff γ∗(qt)
is defined implicitly by evaluating the expected value of an efficient direct investment contract and
the expected value of an efficient portfolio investment contract which involves monitoring. In other
words, γ∗(qt) must satisfy the equation below.
V D(qt, γ∗(qt)) = V PM (qt, γ
∗(qt)) (5)
Thus, foreign investors will strictly prefer direct investment contract if they meet with managers
with γj > γ∗(qt) and, on the contrary, they will prefer portfolio investment contract if γj is lower
than the cutoff level. This optimal choice of the type of investment for each level of γj is proved in
Proposition 5 and presented in Figure 2.
Proposition 5. For all qt, there is a unique cutoff γ∗ > 0 such that
(i) V D(qt, γ∗) = V PM (qt, γ
∗);
(ii) V D(qt, γj) < V PM (qt, γ
j) for γj < γ∗; and
15
(iii) V D(qt, γj) > V PM (qt, γ
j) for γj > γ∗.
Thus, this implies that the indicator function that specifies the decision to become a direct
investor, ZDjt , takes the following form. Z
D
jt = 1 if γ
j > γ∗ and 0 otherwise. Proposition 5 also
implies that, for a given distribution of γj over local managers in the economy, the composition
of the types of investment contracts at any period is completely summarized by this cutoff level.
The dependence of the cutoff level on the relative price of the nontradable good implies that the
composition of foreign investors’ capital inflows will vary with the recipient country’s economic
conditions. This analysis is presented next.
4.3 Changes in Investment Choice as Economic Conditions Vary
This section analyzes how the cutoff level γ∗(qt), which determines the composition of direct invest-
ment contracts and portfolio investment contracts, varies with the model economy’s endowment
of the tradable good yt. In particular, it will be shown that a decline in the economy’s endow-
ment will lead to a decline in the relative price of the nontradable good qt and a higher fraction of
foreign investors choosing direct investment contracts simultaneously. In other words, qt varies in
same direction as yt and γ∗(qt) is an increaing function of qt. These relationships are presented in
Propositions 6 and 7.
Proposition 6. If γ∗(qt) is C1,
∂γ∗(qt)
∂qt
> 0.
The intuition of Proposition 6 is that the effect of the change in the relative price on the
portfolio investment is higher than that on the direct investment for the marginal investor who
was previously indifferent between the two types of investment contracts due to the presence of
the two frictions, information and agency frictions which are more severe for a portfolio investment
contract. In other words, due to the two frictions ∂V
P
M (qt,γ
∗(qt))
∂qt
> ∂V
D(qt,γ∗(qt))
∂qt
. Therefore, for the
marginal foreign investor, any increase in qt will induce him to strictly prefer a portfolio investment
as the price increase will raise the expected value of a portfolio investment contract by more than
that of a direct investment. Conversely, a decrease in the relative price will lower the expected
value of a portfolio investment by much more than that of a direct investment. As all the value
functions are continuous, these changes must also be the case for foreign investors with γj close
enough to the previous cutoff. In addition, as V PM (qt, γ
j) varies negatively with γj , it must be the
case that the cutoff level of monitoring costs will increase as qt rises and decline when qt falls.
Figure 3 demonstrates the changes in the expected values of each type of investment contracts and
the resulting change in the cutoff level γ∗(qt) as qt declines. As can be seen, a decline in qt leads to
a higher fraction of direct investors in the recipient economy. The next proposition completes the
analysis in the general equilibrium model.
To prove that the equilibrium relative price qt declines with a decline in yt, it is sufficient to
show that the amount of the nontradable good supplied in the domestic market by any foreign
investors is strictly increasing in qt. From the market-clearing condition of the nontradable good
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after using the local managers’ budget constraints and the results from Propositions 1 to 5, we have∫
γj
∫
θ
yt
qt
dP (θ)dµ(γj) =
∫
γj
∫
θ
[
θG(ijt)− ZDjtλθG(ijt)−
[
1− ZDjt
]
γjmjt(θ)
]
dP (θ)dµ(γj)
−
∫
γj
∫
θ
xjt(θ, θ)dP (θ)dµ(γj)
=
γ∗(qt)∫
0
θ˜ − ∫
θPM,jt
τ [θ − θPM,jt]dP (θ)
G(iPM,jt)dµ(γj)
−
γ∗(qt)∫
0
γjP (θPM,jt)dµ(γ
j) + [1− µ(γ∗(qt))] [1− λ] θ˜G(iDjt)
The left-hand side of the above equation represents the net quantity demanded of the nontrad-
able good, which is equal to the local managers’ demand in excess of the compensation received
from the investment contracts signed with foreign investors. The right-hand side represents the net
quantity supplied of the nontradable good by foreign investors. This is equal to the amount of the
output after the monitoring costs or the management costs are incurred and the compensation to
the managers are paid.
The next proposition shows that the equilibrium relative price qt will decline with yt. The
intuition of this proposition is simple. In this model economy, local managers are the only buyers
of the foreign investors’ output. As their major source of income decreases, there will be a lower
demand for the nontradable good, their consumption good, in the local market. This will lead to a
lower equilibrium price that clears the local market as long as the aggregate net quantity supplied
of the nontradable good is strictly increasing in qt. From (1) the quantity supplied by the direct
investors are obviously increasing in qt as G(iDjt) is strictly increasing and i
D
jt is strictly increasing
in qt. Proposition 7 shows how the net quantity supplied by the portfolio investors changes as qt
varies; the proof of which is presented in Appendix A.
Proposition 7. The net quantity supplied of the nontradable good by portfolio investors is increas-
ing in qt for each γj. Thus, the equilibrium relative price qt varies positively with yt.
Thus far, it has only been proved that worsen economic conditions of the recipient country of
capital flows will lead to a lower level of total capital inflows, while at the same time more foreign
investors find direct investments more profitable than portfolio investments. This is due to the fact
that the optimal level of all types of investment contracts as well as the cutoff level γ∗(qt) vary
positively with qt. However, it has not yet been proved that the aggregate level of capital inflows
in the form of direct investments, [1− µ(γ∗(qt))] iDjt, may indeed increase as qt declines. The next
section shows results of the model for some parameter values and demonstrates that the aggregate
foreign direct investment inflows may increase for these specific cases.
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5 Numerical Exercises
In this section, the model is parameterized, and the results for different parameter values are
reported. In order to illustrate the effects of changes in the recipient country’s economic conditions
on the levels and composition of international investment inflows, the model is solved for various
values of the recipient country’s endowment of the tradable good yt. A decline in the level of
the endowment represents the economy’s deteriorating economic conditions. In addition, for a
cross-country comparison, the model is solved for two levels of country-wide corporate governance
or institution quality parameter. Countries with a lower overall level of corporate governance or
weaker institutions are represented in this model as countries with a higher τ , the level of stealing
by the manager of the firm. The baseline parameters used are shown in Table 1.
The endowment considered varies between 40, 35, 25, 20, 10, 5, and 2.5 units of the tradable
good. The stealing fraction is assumed to be 30% in countries with weaker corporate governance
and 20% in countries with stronger corporate governance, respectively. In the production of the
nontradable good, the share of the tradable good input κ is assumed to be the same as the share of
the labor input of the local manager, equal to 0.5, and the firms’ productivity levels θ are assumed
to be uniformly distributed between zero and 10. The potential monitoring costs of local managers
γj are between zero and 5 units of the output, the nontradable good, whereas management costs λ
are chosen to be 10% of the output level.
Tables 2 shows results for the case of countries with weaker corporate governance, τ of 30%,
while Table 3 reports similar results for the case of better-corporate-governance countries, τ of
20%. As can be seen in both tables, the model can explain the decline in the total inflows and the
rise in FDI share in the total inflows as economic conditions in the recipient country deteriorate.
When the domestic consumers’ income endowment yt declines, the demand for the nontradable
good in the domestic market declines as well. This leads to a lower equilibrium relative price of
the nontradable good qt and, thus, a lower return from investment to foreign investors. Foreign
investors, therefore, choose to invest less in the country resulting in a lower level of the total inflows.
However, as the return declines, more foreign investors find direct investment more beneficial than
portfolio investment; therefore, the percentage of direct investors and also the share of FDI inflows
in the total inflows increase.
Figure 4 plots the expected value of direct investment and portfolio investment for each level
of γj for two levels of yt, a decrease from 5 and 2.5. As predicted by the model, the expected value
of FDI is strictly increasing in the relative price qt and independent of the monitoring costs γj .
The expected value of portfolio investment is also strictly increasing in qt. However, the value may
vary with γj ; for low enough γj , the case with positive monitoring probability, the expected value
of portfolio investment is higher for lower γj . The highest value it can reach is the value of the
first-best contract which is the case when γj is equal to zero. For high enough γj , it is optimal
for portfolio investors not to monitor at all. In this case, the expected value of the contract is
independent of the monitoring cost. As demonstrated in the figure, there is a unique cutoff level
of the monitoring costs for each cases considered and this cutoff declines as the country’s economic
conditions become worsen.
However, Tables 2 and ?? suggest that the change in the levels of FDI inflows depends on the
initial economic condition of the recipient country of capital flows. FDI inflows may increase if the
economy was initially at a relatively high endowment level. For example, from Table 2, a decline
of yt from 40 to 30 or from 30 to 25 leads to an increase of FDI inflows from 7.49 to 9.64 or from
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9.64 to 10.98, respectively. On the contrary, FDI inflows may also decline together with other flows
if the initial endowment was relatively low; this pattern is observed for the decline of yt from 25
and below. These characteristics of FDI are also observed in Table 3 for the case of a country with
stronger corporate governance. Figure 5 which plots the composition of capital inflows for various
levels of the relative price qt demonstrates this point. Total inflows as well as the share of FDI
decline with qt; the levels of FDI inflows, however, may increase or decrease.
The model can also explain the stylized facts regarding differences in the levels and composition
of international capital across countries. By comparing the results from Tables 2 and 3, the model
suggests that total inflows tend to be higher in countries that have a stronger corporate governance,
while the majority of those inflows take the form of portfolio investment. Countries with a weaker
corporate governance, in contrast, receive a lower level of capital inflows, while the majority of
them are direct investments.
6 Concluding Remarks
Recent empirical evidence has suggested that different forms of financial flows differ remarkably in
their behaviors and this evidence becomes more apparent in developing countries especially during
the time of a crisis. The model developed in the chapter suggests that these characteristics simply
reflect the optimal investment decision of foreign investors in the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion. Since foreign direct investment (FDI) enables foreign investors to overcome the problems of
asymmetric information, this type of investment will become more profitable for many investors
during the time of a crisis as on average its value is less sensitive to the changes in the recipient
country’s economic conditions. Therefore, the model can explain a larger fraction of FDI inflows
during the time of deteriorating economic conditions while other types of flows decline. In addition,
the numerical experiments of the model suggest that the model can also explain the increase in the
level of FDI, as observed in the data, for some parameter values. Furthermore, the model suggests
that a country with weaker corporate governance will attract less capital inflows, while the majority
of the inflows it attracts are in the form of direct investment. This result is also consistent with
empirical evidence.
The model, however, exhibits several limitations. First, the model is solved for some arbitrarily
chosen parameter values. The results would have been more convincing if the model has been
calibrated to match certain quantitative properties observed in the data, especially in terms of the
volatility of each type of capital flows or the changes in the level of each type of capital flows during
a crisis in some countries. In addition, the results of the model strongly rely on the assumptions
about the setup of each type of investment contracts. The results may have been reversed if the
monitoring costs are assumed to be a fraction of the firm’s output and the management costs are
in terms of fixed costs. Lastly, the model economy’s environment is static since all goods in the
model are non-storable, agents have no intertemporal saving technology, and all financial contracts
are only one-period in length. In this respect, adding the dynamic structures to the model may be
one avenue that is worth pursuing.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
To show that there exists a contract that solves (P1) that has the proposed properties is to show
that contracts with the payment v1,jt(θ̂, θ) = θG(ijt) ∀θ̂, θ and xjt(θ̂, θ) = 0 for θ̂ 6= θ satisfy the
same set of constraints as those in (P1) and delivers the same expected payoff to both foreign
investors and local manager. Setting the payment in the second subperiod this way relaxes the
relevant no-stealing constraints as much as possible while satisfying all other constraints without
affecting the objective function in (P1) nor the expected payoff to the manager. Similarly, setting
xjt(θ̂, θ) = 0 for θ̂ 6= θ relaxes the relevant incentive constraints as much as possible without
affecting any other constraints or the objective function. Thus, there must be an efficient contract
that has these properties. If (ii) does not hold, or the manager’s individual rationality constraint
is not binding, it will be possible to increase the investor’s expected return while still satisfying all
the constraints, contradicting that the contract is optimal. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Proof of (i): For reports that lead to monitoring, θ̂ ∈Mjt, setting the payment v1,jt(θ̂, θ) = θG(ijt)
relaxes the relevant no stealing constraints as much as possible while satisfying all other constraints
without affecting the objective function in (P2) nor the expected payoff to the manager. Similarly,
setting xjt(θ̂, θ) = 0 for θ̂ 6= θ, θ̂ ∈Mjt relaxes the relevant incentive constraint as much as possible
without affecting any other constraint or the objective function.
Proof of (ii): For reports that do not lead to monitoring,∀θ̂ /∈Mjt, setting v0,jt(θ̂) = θMjt G(ijt),
where θMjt = inf
θ/∈Mjt
θ, satisfies the relevant limited liability constraint since for all θ̂ /∈ Mjt and θ̂
feasible, θ̂ ≥ θMjt . Then, by letting xjt(θ̂, θ) = τ [θ− θMjt ]G(ijt) for feasible θ̂, θ̂ 6= θ, the relevant no-
stealing constraints are trivially satisfied. To show that the incentive constraints are also satisfied
for ∀θ̂ /∈ Mjt, first note that the ICs are satisfied before for θ̂ = θMjt and θ̂ feasible. Thus, they
must also still be satisfied when v0,jt(θMjt ) is set to the maximum possible value, θ
M
jt G(ijt).
The ICs hold for θ̂ = θMjt , xjt(θ, θ) ≥ xjt(θMjt , θ),
≥ τ [θG(ijt)− v0,jt(θMjt )] by [NP] at θMjt
≥ τ [θG(ijt)− θMjt G(ijt)] by [LL]
Thus, xjt(θ, θ) ≥ xjt(θ̂, θ) ∀θ̂ /∈Mjt, θ̂ feasible
Proof of (iii): We can prove that the monitoring set, Mjt, is the lower interval of Θ, or that the
non-monitoring set, M ′jt, is the upper interval of Θ, by contradiction. Suppose not, then without
loss of generality, there exists a nonempty subset ΘM ⊆ Mjt such that ∀θM ∈ ΘM , θM > θMjt .
Now consider an alternative contract which is otherwise identical to the original contract except
that M˜jt =Mjt/ΘM ; M˜ ′jt =M
′
jt ∪ΘM ; and ∀θM ∈ ΘM , x˜jt(θM , θM ) = xjt(θM , θM ), x˜jt(θM , θ) =
τ [θ − θMjt ]G(ijt), and v0,jt(θM ) = θMjt G(ijt). This contract satisfies all the constraints and by
construction, the expected payoff of the manager remains unchanged. This contract, however,
reduces the monitoring costs and thus improving the investor’s expected return by
∫
ΘM
γjdP (θ).
Thus, this contradicts the fact that the original contract is efficient. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is organized into two steps. To prove (i) and (ii), we consider an alternative contract
that is otherwise identical to the original contract except having the proposed properties that
x˜jt(θ, θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Mjt, and x˜jt(θ, θ) = τ [θ − θMjt ]G(ijt) for all θ /∈ Mjt, and that the
investor pays an uncontingent payment to the manager ˜˜xjt = ∫
Mjt
xjt(θ, θ)dP (θ) +
∫
M ′jt
{xjt(θ, θ) −
τ [θ − θMjt ]G(ijt)}dP (θ), which is ≥ 0 as [LL] and [NP] hold for the original contract. Then, we
can show that this contract not only satisfies the same set of contraints, but also delivers the same
expected return to both the investor and the manager as the original contract.
[NP] is trivially satisfied. Since x˜jt(θ, θ) ≥ 0 for all θ /∈ Mjt, [LL] is satisfied. Similarly, given
the properties of xjt(θ̂, θ) for θ̂ 6= θ from Proposition 1, [IC] is satisfied. By construction, the
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manager and the investor are indifferent between this contract and the original contract as∫
x˜jt(θ, θ)dP (θ) + ˜˜xjt = ∫
Mjt
x˜jt(θ, θ)dP (θ) +
∫
M ′jt
x˜jt(θ, θ)dP (θ) + ˜˜xjt
= 0 +
∫
M ′jt
τ [θ − θMjt ]G(ijt)dP (θ) +
∫
Mjt
xjt(θ, θ)dP (θ)
+
∫
M ′jt
{xjt(θ, θ)− τ [θ − θMjt ]G(ijt)}dP (θ)
=
∫
Mjt
xjt(θ, θ)dP (θ) +
∫
M ′jt
xjt(θ, θ)dP (θ) =
∫
xjt(θ, θ)dP (θ)
Secondly, we show that there is an efficient contract with ˜˜xjt = 0. Given the above results, the
problem now becomes
(P3’) max qt
∫ θG(ijt)dP (θ)− ∫
M ′jt
τ [θ − θMjt ]G(ijt)dP (θ)− ˜˜xjt − γjP (θMjt )
− ijt
s.t. [IR]
∫
M ′jt
τ [θ − θMjt ]G(ijt)dP (θ) + ˜˜xjt ≥ U0
Since in our model the manager has no outside options, U0 = 0, while
∫
M ′jt
τ [θ−θMjt ]G(ijt)dP (θ) is
always positive, it must be the case that ˜˜xjt = 0. If this is not the case, then given that∫
M ′jt
τ [θ− θMjt ]G(ijt)dP (θ) is decreasing in θMjt , it will be possible to increase the investor’s expected
return while still satisfying the individual rationality constraint by reducing ˜˜xjt and θMjt , and thus
the size of the monitoring set, simultaneously. Q.E.D.
Proof of Negative Definiteness of D2V PM (i
P
M,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j)
D2V PM (i
P
M,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j) =
∂F 1∂ijt (iPM,jt, θPM,jt; qt, γj) ∂F 1∂θMjt (iPM,jt, θPM,jt; qt, γj)
∂F 2
∂ijt
(iPM,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j) ∂F
2
∂θMjt
(iPM,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j)

=
qt
θ˜ − ∫
θPM,jt
τ [θ − θPM,jt]dP (θ)
G′′(iPM,jt) qtτ [1− P (θPM,jt)]G′(iPM,jt)
qtτ [1− P (θPM,jt)]G′(iPM,jt) −qtτG(ijt)
dP (θPM,jt)
dθPM,jt
− qtγj dp(θ
P
M,jt)
dθPM,jt

The first leading principal minors is negative by the strict concavity of the production function
G(ijt). Also, with G(i) = i
κ, G′(i) = κ
i1−κ and G
′′(i) = −κ(1−κ)
i2−κ . Thus, we have∣∣∣D2V PM (iPM,jt, θPM,jt; qt, γj)∣∣∣
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= −q2t
θ˜ − ∫
θMjt
τ [θ − θMjt ]dP (θ)
G′′(ijt)× [τG(ijt)dP (θMjt )dθMjt + γj dp(θMjt )dθMjt
]
−
[
qtτ [1− P (θMjt )]G′(ijt)
]2
=−q2t
θ˜ − ∫
θMjt
τ [θ − θMjt ]dP (θ)
 −κ(1−κ)
i2−κ ∗
[
τiκ
dP (θMjt )
dθMjt
+ γj
dp(θMjt )
dθMjt
]
−
[
qtτ [1− P (θMjt )] κi1−κ
]2
For the case of a uniform distribution function p(θ),
dp(θMjt )
dθMjt
= 0, p(θMjt ) =
1
B−A , θ˜ =
B−A
2 ,
[1− P (θMjt )] =
B−θMjt
B−A , and
∫
θMjt
[θ − θMjt ]dP (θ) = (
B−θMjt )
2
2(B−A) . Thus, we have
∣∣∣D2V PM (iPM,jt, θPM,jt; qt, γj)∣∣∣ = q2ti2(1−κ) τκ
{
(1−κ)
2 −
[
B−θMjt
B−A
]2
τ(1+κ)
2
}
.
Since the term in the bracket is strictly increasing in θMjt and takes value between [
(1−κ)
2 −[
B
B−A
]2
τ(1+κ)
2 ] and
(1−κ)
2 , Assumption 2.3 guarantees that
∣∣∣D2V PM (ijt , θMjt ; qt, γj)∣∣∣ > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Since for the case of γj > 0, P (θMjt ) < 1, we can rewrite the nonlinear systems that define the
solution to a portfolio investor’s maximization problem as
F 1(iPM,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j) = qt
θ˜ − ∫
θPM,jt
τ [θ − θPM,jt]dP (θ)
G′(iPM,jt)− 1 = 0 and
F 2(iPM,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j) = [1− P (θMjt )]
[
qtτG(ijt)−
qtγjp(θMjt )
[1−P (θMjt )]
]
= 0
In this case
∂F 2(ijt ,θ
M
jt ; qt, γ
j)
∂θMjt
= −p(θMjt )]
[
qtτG(ijt)−
qtγjp(θMjt )
[1−P (θMjt )]
]
−[1−P (θMjt )]qtγj
dh(θMjt )
dθMjt
. Since
the hazard function h(θMjt ) =
p(θMjt )
[1−P (θMjt )]
for the uniform distribution is strictly increase in θMjt , this
partial derivative become ∂F
2
∂θMjt
(iPM,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j) = −[1 − P (θPM,jt)]qtγj
dh(θPM,jt)
dθMjt
< 0 as the first
term is equal to zero by the F.O.C.
Since the Hessian matrix D2V PM (i
P
M,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j) is nonsingular at (iPM,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j), we
can linearize the systems of the two first-order conditions into
∂F 1
∂ijt
dijt +
∂F 1
∂θMjt
dθMjt +
∂F 1
∂qt
dqt + ∂F
1
∂γj
dγj = 0
∂F 2
∂ijt
dijt +
∂F 2
∂θMjt
dθMjt +
∂F 2
∂qt
dqt + ∂F
2
∂γj
dγj = 0
where all the partial derivatives are evaluated at (iPM,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j) and use the Implicit
Function Theorem and apply Cramer’s rule to the linearized systems above to find ∂i
P
M (qt,γ
j)
∂qt
,
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∂iPM (qt,γ
j)
∂γj
,
∂θPM (qt,γ
j)
∂qt
, and ∂θ
P
M (qt,γ
j)
∂γj
.
Since ∂F
1
∂ijt
< 0, ∂F
1
∂θMjt
= ∂F
2
∂ijt
> 0, ∂F
2
∂θMjt
< 0, ∂F
1
∂qt
=
θ˜ − ∫
θMjt
τ [θ − θMjt ]dP (θ)
G′(ijt) > 0,
∂F 1
∂γj
= 0, ∂F
2
∂qt
= 0, and ∂F
2
∂γj
= −qtp(θMjt ) < 0,
∂iPM (qt,γ
j)
∂qt
= −
det
2
664
∂F 1
∂qt
∂F 1
∂θMjt
∂F 2
∂qt
∂F 2
∂θMjt
3
775
|D2V PM (iPM,jt,θPM,jt; qt, γj)| = −
∂F1
∂qt
∂F2
∂θM
jt
|D2V PM | = −
(+)(−)
(+) > 0
∂iPM (qt,γ
j)
∂γj
= −
det
2
664
∂F 1
∂γj
∂F 1
∂θMjt
∂F 2
∂γj
∂F 2
∂θMjt
3
775
|D2V PM | = −
− ∂F2
∂γj
∂F1
∂θM
jt
|D2V PM | =
(−)(+)
(+) < 0
∂θPM (qt,γ
j)
∂qt
= −
det
2
664
∂F 1
∂ijt
∂F 1
∂qt
∂F 2
∂ijt
∂F 2
∂qt
3
775
|D2V PM (iPM,jt,θPM,jt; qt, γj)| = −
− ∂F2
∂ijt
∂F1
∂qt
|D2V PM | =
(+)(+)
(+) > 0
∂θPM (qt,γ
j)
∂γj
= −
det
2
664
∂F 1
∂ijt
∂F 1
∂γj
∂F 2
∂ijt
∂F 2
∂γj
3
775
|D2V PM | = −
∂F1
∂ijt
∂F2
∂γj
|D2V PM | = −
(−)(−)
(+) < 0
Next, to show that V PM (ijt , θ
M
jt ; qt, γ
j) is strictly decreasing in γj and strictly increasing in qt
when evaluated at iPM (qt, γ
j) and θPM (qt, γ
j), apply the Envelope Theorem. Since V PM (ijt , θ
M
jt ; qt, γ
j)
is a C1 function of (ijt , θ
M
jt ; qt, γ
j) and the solution of the maximization problem iPM (qt, γ
j) and
θPM (qt, γ
j) are C1 function of (qt, γj),
dV PM (i
P
M,jt,θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j)
dγj
=
∂V PM (i
P
M,jt,θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j)
∂γj
and, similarly,
dV PM (i
P
M,jt,θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j)
dqt
=
∂V PM (i
P
M,jt,θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j)
∂qt
. Therefore,
∂V PM (i
P
M,jt,θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j)
∂γj
= −qtP (θPM,jt) < 0.
Since V PM (i
P
M,jt, θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j) > 0, we have
∂V PM (i
P
M,jt,θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j)
∂qt
=
θ˜ − ∫
θPM,jt
τ [θ − θPM,jt]dP (θ)
G(iPM,jt)− γjP (θPM,jt)
 > 0. In par-
ticular,
∂V PM (i
P
M,jt,θ
P
M,jt; qt, γ
j)
∂qt
=
θ˜ − ∫
θPM,jt
τ [θ − θPM,jt]dP (θ)
[iPM,jt]κ − γjP (θPM,jt) = 1κqt iPM,jt −
γjP (θPM,jt). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5
By Proposition 4, V PM (qt, γ
j) is strictly decreasing and continuous in γj for any qt. Since lim
γj→0
V PM (qt, γ
j)
= V FB(qt, γj) where V FB(qt, γj) > V D(qt, γj), and for high enough γj , V PM (qt, γ
j) → V PN (qt, γj)
where V PN (qt, γ
j) < V D(qt, γj) for all qt, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there must be a
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unique cutoff γ∗ > 0 such that V D(qt, γ∗) = V PM (qt, γ
∗). Define γ∗(qt) implicitly by V D(qt, γ∗(qt)) =
V PM (qt, γ
∗(qt)). Since V PM (qt, γ
j) is strictly decreasing in γj for each qt while V D(qt, γj) is indepen-
dent of γj , for γj < γ∗(qt) it must be the case that V D(qt, γj) < V PM (qt, γ
j), and V D(qt, γj) >
V PM (qt, γ
j) otherwise. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
If γ∗(qt) is a C1 solution to (5), by the Implicit Function Theorem where all the derivatives are
evaluated at (qt, γ∗(qt)), we have
∂γ∗(qt)
∂qt
= −
[
∂V D(qt, γ∗(qt))
∂qt
− ∂V
P
M (qt, γ
∗(qt))
∂qt
]
/
[
∂V D(qt, γ∗(qt))
∂γj
− ∂V
P
M (qt, γ
∗(qt))
∂γj
]
.
Since ∂V
D(qt,γ∗(qt))
∂γj
= 0 and ∂V
P
M (qt,γ
∗(qt))
∂γj
= −qtP (θPM (qt, γ∗(qt))) < 0, ∂γ
∗(qt)
∂qt
has the same
sign as
[
∂V PM (qt,γ
∗(qt))
∂qt
− ∂V D(qt,γ∗(qt))∂qt
]
. From (1) and (4), ∂V
D(qt,γ∗(qt))
∂qt
= 1κqt i
D(qt, γ∗(qt)) and
∂V PM ( qt, γ
∗(qt))
∂qt
= 1κqt i
P
M (qt, γ
∗(qt)) − γ∗(qt)P (θPM (qt, γ∗(qt))). Thus,
[
∂V PM (qt,γ
∗(qt))
∂qt
− ∂V D(qt,γ∗(qt))∂qt
]
= [
iPM (qt,γ
∗(qt))−iD(qt,γ∗(qt))]
κqt
−γ∗(qt)P (θPM (qt, γ∗(qt))).
Using the definition of γ∗(qt) which is defined in (5) and the functional form of V D(qt, γj) and
V PM (qt, γ
j) from (1) and (4), it must be the case that[
1
κ − 1
]
iD(qt, γ∗(qt)) =
[
1
κ − 1
]
iPM (qt, γ
∗(qt))− qtγ∗(qt)P (θPM (qt, γ∗(qt)))
or γ∗(qt)P (θPM (qt, γ
∗(qt))) = 1qt
[
1
κ − 1
] [
iPM (qt, γ
∗(qt))− iD(qt, γ∗(qt))
]
.
Notice that since γ∗(qt) > 0 and P (θPM (qt, γ
∗(qt) > 0, iPM (qt, γ
∗(qt)) > iD(qt, γ∗(qt)) i.e. there
is a jump in the level of investment even though the value functions are equal.
Therefore,
[
∂V PM (qt,γ
∗(qt))
∂qt
− ∂V D(qt,γ∗(qt))∂qt
]
= 1κqt
[
iPM (qt, γ
∗(qt))− iD(qt, γ∗(qt))
]
− 1qt
[
1
κ − 1
] [
iPM (qt, γ
∗(qt))− iD(qt, γ∗(qt))
]
= iPM (qt, γ
∗(qt))− iD(qt, γ∗(qt)) > 0. Q.E.D.
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Appendix B Empirical Evidence
Figures 6-11 plot international capital flows by foreign investors in six developing countries that
experienced a financial crisis during the 1990s. All figures were constructed using annual data from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database, March
2006. Total flow is classified into foreign direct investment (FDI) and non-FDI flows.9 For foreign
direct investment (FDI) flows, IFS’s direct investment in reporting economy (line 78bed) was used.
Non-direct investment flows are calculated as the sum of IFS’s portfolio investment liabilities (line
78bmd), debt security liabilities (line 78bnd), and other investment liabilities (line78bid). In the
model, non-FDI flows are referred to as portfolio investment.
As can be seen in all figures with the exception of Figure 11 for Malaysia, non-FDI flows
responded very sharply to the crises. For example, in Figure 6 non-FDI flows in Mexico fell to less
than a third of the 1993 level in 1994 and then turned negative. Similarly, in Figures 7 and 8, they
declined by more than 80 percent in Korea and 50 percent in the Philippines over the course of one
year of the crises and then turned negative. From Figures 9 and 10 for Thailand and Indonesia,
non-FDI flow even turned negative during the first year. However, this pattern was not observed
for Malaysia in Figure 11.
The behavior of FDI flows, on the contrary, differs dramatically across the two groups of
countries, classified according to whether or not the crises involved a default by the country’s
government on its debts and an imposition of controls on international capital.10 As illustrated
in Figures 6-9, FDI flows had increased over the course of the crisis periods when there were no
capital controls or sovereign default. FDI flows had almost doubled in the Philippines, a little more
than doubled in Mexico and Korea, and tripled in Thailand. In contrast, from Figures 10 and 11,
the FDI flows had fallen in Indonesia and Malaysia.
9Plotting net flows as the sums between foreign investors’ and residents’ investment gives similar results.
10For more details on the policies used, see http://www.duke.edu/˜charvey/Country risk/couindex.htm
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Figure 1: The Timeline of an Investment Contract within Each Period
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Figure 2: Expected Value of Each Type of an Efficient Investment Contract
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Figure 3: Comparative Statics of the Expected Value of Each Type of an Efficient Investment
Contract with q1 < q2
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Expected Value of Each Type of Investment
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Figure 5: Composition of International Capital Inflows, a Partial Equilibrium Analysis
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Figure 6: International Capital Flows by Foreign Investors in Mexico
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS) database, Mar 06.
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Figure 7: International Capital Flows by Foreign Investors in Korea
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS) database, Mar 06.
Figure 8: International Capital Flows by Foreign Investors in the Philippines
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS) database, Mar 06.
30
Figure 9: International Capital Flows by Foreign Investors in Thailand
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS) database, Mar 06.
Figure 10: International Capital Flows by Foreign Investors in Indonesia
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Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (IFS) database, Mar 06.
31
Figure 11: International Capital Flows by Foreign Investors in Malaysia
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Table 1: Baseline Parameters
Parameter Values Description 
ty 40, 35, 25, 20, 10, 5, and 2.5 Endowment of the tradable good in the 
recipient country 
τ 0.3 and 0.2 Stealing fraction 
θ  [0:0.1:10], uniformly distributed Firms' productivity 
κ 0.5 Tradable good share in the production 
jγ [0:0.01:5] Monitoring costs 
λ  0.1 Management costs 
32
Table 2: Levels and Composition of Capital Inflows by Foreign Investors for τ =30%
40ty = 35ty = 25ty = 20ty = 10ty = 5ty = 2.5ty =
Relative price tq    3.33   3.06   2.47   2.15   1.38   0.89   0.57 
Total Inflows  67.06  55.89 35.44 26.26 10.46   4.22   1.7135
FDI Inflows    7.49    9.64 10.98 10.28   6.18   3.08   1.41 
% of FDI/Total 11% 17% 31% 39% 59% 73% 82% 
% of Direct Investors 13% 20% 36% 44% 64% 77% 85% 
Table 3: Levels and Composition of Capital Inflows by Foreign Investors for τ =20%
40ty = 35ty = 25ty = 20ty = 10ty = 5ty = 2.5ty =
Relative price tq    3.33    3.06    2.47    2.15   1.38   0.89   0.57 
Total Inflows  67.47  56.19  35.60  26.36 10.49   4.22   1.18 
FDI Inflows    4.47    7.37    9.81    9.49   5.96   3.02   1.39 
% of FDI/Total 7% 13% 28% 36% 57% 72% 81% 
% of Direct Investors 8% 16% 32% 41% 62% 75% 84% 
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